By stepwise investigating reflection on multiple levels of analysis, a synthesizing understanding of reflection that is biologically plausible can arguably be reached (see, e.g., Hassabis et al. Given this position, our aim in this article is to investigate reflection more broadly by examining relevant psychological constructs and their neural underpinnings. In short, we believe that Kornblith’s discussion of reflection is problematic due to its too-narrow understanding of what reflection brings to the table. We claim, as does Kornblith, that such a stance can offer philosophy new insights that are crucial for keeping the field relevant as well as for dissolving old problems. Accordingly, we accept both ontological and (cooperative) methodological naturalism, where natural phenomena and relevant scientific results are seen as more important than language or intuitions (see, e.g., Papineau 2016 Rysiew 2017 Cellucci 2017). In line with Kornblith (see, e.g., 1993, 2002, 2012), we heed a naturalistic stance where philosophy needs to take relevant scientific results into account whenever such results are available. We recognize that inquiries are affected by the inquirer’s stance (approach, commitments), which makes it important to briefly clarify our own. On the other hand, empirical evidence seems to support Kornblith’s view and suggest that reflection only brings a false sense of certainty. On the one hand, reflection seems to underlie the very essence of human greatness and is commonly seen as a particularly important phenomenon. This leaves us at an interesting junction. With this in mind, the importance of reflection, and its role for human thinking, knowledge, and justification, should arguably be deemphasized. Numerous psychological studies, seemingly, show how human reflection often fails due to, for example, various biases (see, e.g., Stanovich and West 2000 Kahneman 2011). Indeed much relevant research seems to indicate that rather than providing trustworthy knowledge, reflection can be quite unreliable. Common traditional positions have included that reflection is necessary in order to guarantee that an agent’s knowledge is acceptable and certain, that her epistemic duty is fulfilled, that her knowledge is accessible, and that faulty beliefs due to inferential errors are avoided (see, e.g., Pappas 2017 see also Bortolotti 2011).īut in contrast to the above-described positions, Hilary Kornblith in his book On reflection ( 2012) points out that the common interpretation of reflection is problematic since reflection actually cannot provide that which many believe it can. Accordingly, a lot of effort has been invested in the inquiry of its role for thinking, knowledge, and justification. Its role has long been prominent and can still be found at the center of theories by contemporary scholars such as, for example, BonJour ( 1985, 1998), Chisholm ( 1989), and Sosa ( 2007, 2009). Throughout the history of Western philosophy, reflection has been considered an especially important human ability.
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